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STATE TAXATION OF AIRPLANES IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
ROBERT L. HowARD*
Since the decision of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky' in
1905 holding that "tangible personal property, permanently located in other
states," is not taxable at the domicile of the owner, there has been relatively
little controversy about state jurisdiction to tax tangible property. An ex-
ception to the rule asserted in this case was recognized in the case of ship
property permanently outside the state of the owner's domicile but which,
because of the nature of its use on the high seas, acquired no situs for tax-
ation in any other state.2 This was a logical outgrowth of the earlier hold-
ing that ships temporarily within a state for repairs, loading or unloading
cargo, et cetera, though present on tax day, were not subject to the state's
annual property tax.3
The handling of this situation and that of state taxation of rolling
stock of railroads used in interstate transportation furnish perhaps the most
useful partial guides to be found among the decidedcases in any considera-
tion of the problem of state taxation of airplane property used in interstate
commerce.
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in the case of Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. State of Minnesota4 relied very largely upon the railroad rolling stock
tax cases to arrive at opposite conclusions with respect to the power of the
state of the corporate domicile of the owner to tax the full value of a fleet
of airplanes regularly employed on fixed routes and schedules over several
states in addition to the taxing state. Mr. Justice Jackson relied principally
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri .A.B. University of Missouri, 1917,
A.M. 1918, LL.B. 1925; S.J.D. Harvard 1933.
1. 199 U. S. 194, 208 (1905).
2. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
3. Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855).
4. 322 U. .S. 292 (1944). Mr. Justice Frankfurter is listed as having "an-
nounced the conclusion and judgment of the Court," and his opinion is referred to
herein as the majority opinion, but he spoke fully for only two others besides him-
self. Both Justice Black and Justice Jackson concurred in the result of full taxability
by the state of domicile but did so in separate concurring opinions.
(195)
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on the ship cases restricting taxation to the state of the owner's domicile
to concur in the result reached by the majority sustaining the tax and there-
by avoided the principal difficulties encountered by the writers of the other
two principal opinions.5 Mr. Justice Black followed the process of reason-
ing familiar to all students of his opinions since his dissents in Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. StorenP and Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henne-
ford7 to the effect that the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce is broad enough to permit that branch of the government to deal
with this problem of overlapping state taxation affecting such commerce,
that the judiciary by its piecemeal approach is ill equipped to deal effec-
tively with the problem, and until Congress acts "we should enter the
field with extreme caution." He thus joined as one of the five man majority
of the Court sustaining validity of Minnesota's tax. It is also worthy of
note in this connection that Mr. Justice Jackson strongly emphasized the
power of Congress to step in and control the whole matter, by way of
protecting interstate commerce from the burden of state taxation, should
it see fit to do so," and that Mr. Justice Frankfurter also specifically recog-
nizes this fact 9 and strongly implied that the problem might be better
handled by leaving it to "legislative statesmanship."' 0
The fact that this case was decided more than a year ago does not
mean that the problems involved are no longer current. The Court divided
five to four and no theory commanded the support of more than a minority
of the justices. That which rather generally had been thought to be well
settled doctrine since the decision of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, forty years ago again has become highly debatable as applied
to a type of property destined to occupy a prominent place in our interstate
Commerce of the future. Such being the case some decisions of earlier cases
merit a careful reexamination in the light of this new problem.
It is probably correct to say that under the original common law con-
ception responsible for the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam the state
or nation of the owner's domicile was recognized as having authority to
5. In so doing Mr. Justice Jackson placed stronger emphasis on the "home
port" idea than appears to be justified by the cases.
6. 304 U. S. 307, 316 (1938).
7. 305 U. S. 434, 442 (1939).
8. 322 U. S. 292, 303, 304.
9. Id. at 297, 298.
10. Id. at 300.
11. 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
Vol. 10
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impose a tax measured by the total value of the owner's personal property,
tangible and intangible alike, regardless of where the property itself might
be located, even though kept permanently in some other jurisdiction. 12 If
such is true, the application rather generally had to do largely with simple
items of property varying considerably in nature from those types with
which modern taxing statutes are most concerned, commonly kept at or
moving with the owner's domicile, and frequently of a nature facilitating
concealment. The problem of exempting from the application of this maxim
tangible property held elsewhere than at the owner's domicile had not re-
quired authoritative determination by the United States Supreme Court
prior to the early part of the present century, though it had been recognized
earlier that such property might be separated from the owner and "taxed
on its own account at the place where it is actually located."' 3 In like fashion
it had also been recognized that rolling stock of railroads operating in inter-
state commerce and in and out of states other than the domicile of the cor-
porate owner might be taxed by such other states on some basis of appor-
tionment of their value to use in said states, some type of capital stock tax
being commonly employed, even though the same cars were not continuously
in the taxing state and all may have returned from time to time, or regu-
larly, to the owner's domicile.14 Whether the state of the corporate domicile
12. Such a doctrine is asserted in 26 R. C. L. § 241; was definitely recognized
in England by the Privy Council in the case of Tupper v. Treasurer of Hospital of
St. Peter Port, 3 Knapp 406, 12 English' Reports 706 (1836); was suggested by the
United States Supreme Court in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141
U. S. 18 (1891), and in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentuccky, 199 U. S.
194, 206 (1905) as probably being at the basis of several state court decisions,
though without clear evidence of its having been applied in strictly tangible property
cases; is asserted or finds support in Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall.
490 (U. S. 1873); Lewis & Holmes Motor Freight Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 195 Ga.
810, 25 S.E. (2d) 699 (1943); Commonwealth v. Union Refrigerator Transit Co., 80.
S.W. 490 (Ky. 1904); Gulf Refining Co. v. Tillinghast, 152 La. 847, 94 So. 418
(1922); Bemis v. Board Aldermen, 14 Allen 366 (Mass. 1867); Callender Naviga-
tion Co. v. Pomeroy, 61 Ore. 343, 122 Pac. 758 (1912); Great Southern Life Ins.
Co. v. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778 (Tex. 1922); First Trust Joint Stock Land
Bank of Chicago v. City of Dallas, 167 S.W. (2d) 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942);
and is very broadly asserted in" an article in 1945 Wis. L. REv. 125.
13. Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499 (U. S. 1873);
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall 300, 323, 324 (U. S. 1872); State Railroad
Tax Cases, 82 U. S. 575, 607, 608 (1875).
14. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. (1891) (proportion'
of capital stock); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 166.
U. S. 185 (1897) (proportion of capital stock); American Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899) (value of average number of cars in state at all
times); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149 (1899) (value of
average number of cars in state at all times).
1945
3
Howard: Howard: State Taxation of Airplanes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1945
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
must reduce the valuation accordingly for its own tax purposes or could tax
such property at its full value was not determined by these cases. It is
worthy of note that three justices dissented from the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Pdnlman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania on the
theory that the state of incorporation could tax the full value of such
rolling stock and to allow the states in which the cars operate "only tran-
siently . . . in the transaction of their commercial operations" to tax any
part of the value would be unjust and a burden on interstate commerce.15
It was, however, recognized by a decision of the United States Supreme
Court in 1904 that the value of personal property shipped by a railroad
company to another state for sale and not to be returned to the domiciliary
state should be excluded from the value of the capital stock of the corporate
owner for purposes of taxation by the latter state.16
Such, briefly, was the state of the law when there came to the Supreme
Court Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky'7 and New York Central
Railroad Co. v. Miller,"' two cases whose proper interpretations are drawn
in question in the Northwest Airlines0 case and on which the majority opin-
ion in the latter case is expressly based.
The issue presented in the first of these cases was stated at the outset
of the Court's opinion to be "... whether a corporation organized under
the laws of Kentucky, is subject to taxation upon its tangible personal
property, permanently located in other States, and employed there in the
prosecution of its business." 20 The opinion throughout is replete with asser-
tions of the impropriety of the -state of domicile being permitted to tax
property "wholly within the taxing power of another state,"" "wholly and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of another state," and which "receives
none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be the compensa-
tion,' 1 2 c permanently located in another State,"' 23 and that such tangible
property "is taxable in the State where it is permanently located and em-
15. 141 U. S. 18, 33, 35 (1891).
16. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341
(1905); cf. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885).
17. 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
18. New York ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Miller, 202
U. S. 584 (1906).
19. Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
20. 199 U. S. 194, 201. (Italics supplied).
21. Id. at 202.
22. Id. at 204.'
23. Id. at 208.
Vol. 10
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ployed and where it receives its entire protection, irrespective of the dom-
icil of the owner. '24 The opinion ends with the statement that "the cars in
question, so far as they were located and employed in other States than
Kentucky, were not subject to the taxing power of that Commonwealth.
"25
There is nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court nor in its recital
of the facts found by the trial court in Kentucky to indicate that the cars
excluded from Kentucky taxation by this decision were ever at any time
during the tax years in question within the physical confines of that state.
It is stated that the Transit Company, a Kentucky corporation, owned two
thousand refrigerator cars which were rented to shippers who took posses-
sion of them at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and used them for carriage of freight
in the United States, Canada and Mexico. The trial court asserted that
the "correct method of ascertaining the number of cars which should be
assessed for taxation was to ascertain and list such a proportion of its cars
as, under a system of averages upon their gross earnings, were shown to be
used in the State of Kentucky. ."28 By this process it was determined
that the value of from 28 to 67 cars should be taxed in Kentucky for the
years 1879 to 1900 here drawn in question. The Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky held that all two thousand cars were taxable in that state under a
statute calling for a tax on domestic corporations for the value of all real
estate within the state and "all personal property, whether tangible or in-
tangible, and whether within or without the state.' ' 27 Nothing in that
opinion throws any light on the question of whether or not the cars were
within the commonwealth of Kentucky at any time during the tax years.
Certainly the language of the United States Supreme Court ,opinion is well
calculated to leave the impression that the cars excluded from state taxation,
being permanently outside the state and receiving their entire protection
from other states, were at no time during the tax years within the state.
The facts that the corporation merely owned and hired to shippers refriger-
ator cars to be used at the latters' discretion throughout the United States,
Canada and Mexico, had its principal place of business at St. Louis, Mis-
souri, and transferred possession of its cars and received them back again
24. Id. at 206. (Italics supplied).
25. Id. at 211.
26. Id. at 195. (Italics supplied).
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at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, would seem to be easily consistent with the
entire absence of most of the cars from the state of domicile throughout the
whole of the tax year. Such a state of facts would mean that the only basis
for claiming a right to tax the whole fleet would be that the corporate owner
had its domicile in the state.28 A careful study of the state court's opinion
makes it abudantly clear that that is the basis upon which that court de-
cided the case.29 During the forty years since this case was decided it has
28. It is true that the fact the taxable proporton in the state was being
determined by taking the ratio of gross earnings in the state to total gross earnings
would be consistent with a situation in which all of the cars came into the state at
some time during the tax years, but it would be equally consistent with the fact of
only a few cars entering the state during the tax years and those being changing cars
with no record of what cars did and what cars did not come into the state. Mr.
Justice Stone in the Airlines case states that "The Transit Company disclaimed on
the record any effort to prove that it had any cars which never came within the
state, and sought to establish the number 'permanently located' outside it only by
proof of gross earnings within and without the state." 322 U. S. 292, 324, n. S. While
this fact is not discernible from a study of the reports of the case it must appear
in the record to which the present writer does not have access. Such a situation
would be consistent with the fact of all cars coming within the state at some time
during the year, but there is no positive indication that they did so. Also, as indi-
cated above, so far as reports of the case indicate, it may have been the county
court that suggested the formula for determining the proportionate part of car value
taxable which was apparently acceptable to the company. The further fact that the
corporation here involved was not a railroad company and rented its cars out to
shippers for use anywhere would probably indicate that such cars did not operate
over fixed routes and schedules so as to acquire a situs for taxation in other states
on any average of cars or a mileage of track over which the cars constantly operated
as in the Pullman's Palace Car case. In this respect the facts may very well have
been much the same as in the New York Central case discussed below, and there
is nothing in either court report in this case (80 S. W. 490; 199 U. S. 194) to indi-
cate that any of the cars were actually taxed in any other state. Thus the basis
for attempting to restrict taxation by the state of domicile mjght well be other than
taxability in other states on an apportionment basis. Probable knowledge of the
state of the law in Kentucky as to the application of the maxim nobilia seqtuntur
personam, as pointed out infra, Note 29, could well account for failure to offer proof
that part of the cars did not enter the state at all during the tax years.
29. All that appears from the reports (199 U. S. 194; 80 S. W. 490) is that a
proceeding was instituted to require the company to list its cars, presumably all
2,000, for state and county taxation. This was resisted before the county court
with the result that a judgment was rendered requiring the company to list such
proportion of its cars as, under a system of averages, were shown to be used in the
state during the fiscal year. From this judgment the commonwealth appealed to
the circuit court of Jefferson County where the judgment was affirmed and further
appeal was carried to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky where that judgment was
reversed on the ground that all 2,000 cars were taxable by the state. The Court of
Appeals, in rendering this decision, asserted very vigorously the right of the state
to tax all personal property, tangible and intangible, of residents or domestice corpo-
rations, regardless of where that property might be located, temporarily or per-
manently, unless the state statute provided for exemption. That was the basis for
the decision and Kentucky cases were cited to show that such was the established
law of the state. 80 S. W. 491, 492. Thus it would have made no difference in the
Vol. 10
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been commonly cited for this proposition and it is upon this basis that the
majority opinion in the Nortitwest Airlines case deals with this case.
The second of these earlier cases requiring careful consideration, that
decision of the state court if the company could have shown that all 2,000 of the
cars were outside the state during the whole of the tax year. Any such showing
would have been futile, apparently, in any effort at tax reduction, and a different
approach was employed.
The company asserted instead that such of its cars as were used in foreign
(probably meant to include also interstate) commerce were not subject to taxation
in Kentucky under the language of the statute, and, if the statute were construed
to apply, the statute would be void as in violation of the state constitution and of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
As to falling within the statute, the state court asserted that, "Appellee being
a corporation organized under the laws of this state, its personal property, whether
tangible or intangible, and whether in or out of the state, must be taxed hfere, by
the terms of the law."
After referring to some alleged "tendency of legislative enactment and judicial
construction .. . to trench upon the legal 'Mobilia sequuntur personam,"' the
court went on to say, "Our state upholds and enforces the ancient fiction in all
of its original severity ... And whatever may be said as to the judicial utterances
of other jurisdictions, our court has uniformly held that, for the purpose of taxation,
the situs of personal property of every description is the domicile of the owner.'"
80 S. W. at 491. This certainly makes it abundantly clear that the court was
following the old maxim "in all of its original severity" with no regard to where
the personal property might be located, temporarily or permanently, and any
evidence that part of the cars never came within the confines of the state would
have been regarded as wholly immaterial.
The consideration given by the state court to the claims of violation of the
state constitution makes this conclusion even clearer. "It is urged ...that the
statute which requires movable personal property situated in a different jurisdiction
to be taxed at the domicile of the owner is invalid as being in contravention of the
provisions of section 171 of the (state) Constitution" which provides that "'Taxes
• ..shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax.'" This provision, it was argued, ". . . limits
the power of taxation to property actually within the territoril limits of the taxing
jurisdiction. This we think is erroneous. The subject-matter of the language ...
is uniformity. There is no attempt to enumerate the subjects of taxation . . .The
language ... that taxes shall be 'uniform upon all property subject to taxation,'
together with the provision that "'All property, not exempted from taxation by
this Constitution, shall be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value' . . . requires
that all property of which the state has jurisdiction, except that which is exempted,
shall be taxed; and instead of limiting the subjects of taxation to personal property
having an actual situs within the territorial limits, the section extends the zone of
taxation until it equals that of jurisdiction." 80 S. W. at 492. The conception of
'jurisdiction' as here employed clearly seems to include tangible property of a
domestic corporation kept permanently outside the state.
The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment alleged to be violated was that of
equal protection, since all of appellee's cars were being taxed while cars of railroad
companies in use outside the state were omitted.
This difference in treatment was justified by the court because "Railroad
corporations occupy a unique position in our fiscal system. They are, by express
language of the Constitution, taken out of the category of other property as to the
manner in which they are taxed." 80 S. W. at 493.
,1945
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of New York Central R. R. v. Miller,30 was decided in the year follow-
ing the decision in the Union Transit case. Under a statute imposing a tax
on all domestic corporation to be "computed upon the basis of the amount
of its capital stock employed within this state" a tax was imposed upon
the total value of the railroad company's rolling stock. A contention that
a proportion of the total value of the capital stock should be deducted be-
cause a considerable proportion of the company's cars were constantly out-
side the state was denied, there being no showing that any of the cars "were
used continuously and exclusively outside of the State during the whole tax
year, ' 31 and no showing "that any specific cars or any average of cars was
so continuously in any other state as to be taxable there. '3 2 It was also
added that the absences of cars from the state were not in the course of
travel upon fixed routes but random excursion of casually chosen cars
determined by varying orders of shippers and the convenience of other roads.
The case of Pullnan's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania," which had
upheld a tax on a foreign corporation levied on such proportion of its capital
stock as the miles of track over which its cars were run within the state bore
to the total miles of track over which its cars were run, had been relied on
by the company in support of its contention that a proportion of the total
vilue of its cars would be subject to taxation in other states and as a con-
sequence should entitle it to a corresponding reduction in the state of domi-
cile. The reference of the Court in the New York Central case to this case
is a bit confusing. Among other things it had been found as a fact in the
latter case by the trial court that the "cars used in this State have, during
all the time for which tax is charged, been running into, through and out
of this State."'34 Whether the same cars were coming in and going out
throughout the year is not clear and probably is not important, but the
Court in the New York Central case asserted that in this earlier case "The
same cars were continuously receiving the protection of the State and,
therefore, it -was just that the State should tax a proportion of them.
Whether if the same amount of protection had been received in respect to
constantly changing cars the same principle would have applied was not
30. New York ex rel. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Miller, 202
U. S. 584 (1906).
31. Id. at 594.
32. Id. at 597.
33. 141 U. S. 18 (1891).
34. Id. at 20.
Vol. 10
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decided.... ."a While it seems probable that the Court here may have mis-
conceived the facts in the Pullmz's Palace Car case, it is safe to say that
other cases have clearly eliminated any necessity for finding that the same
cars were constantly in the process of passing in and out of the taxing
state.30 The Court in the New York Central case, after emphasizing the
absence of any finding of specific cars or averages being taxable in other
states and referring to the sporadic nature of their journeys, asserted that
as a result "we need not consider . . .whether there is any parallelism
between liability elsewhere and immunity at home."" One should not
overlook the Court's emphasis on this apparent absence of taxability else-
where in evaluating this case.
On the basis of this case it has been asserted that it has never been
decided that the state of domicile must deduct from the full value of the
rolling stock of a domestic railroad company, when imposing a tax, an
amount proportioned by the number of cars which are constantly in other
states.38
Certainly the case has been rather commonly regarded as standing for
the proposition that where the units of rolling stock return from time to
time during the tax year to the state of domicile, that state may tax the
full value despite the fact that many or all units are out of the state sub-
stantial portions of the tax year,30 and no case has made it clear that this
result is to be affected by the fact that such items of property do operate
in other states in such a way as to permit those states to tax on some pro-
portionate basis. So far as orthodox notions as to the basis of jurisdiction
to tax and the due process clause are concerned it may be that both taxes
might well be sustained.
There is nothing in the case of Jolvason Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma,4"
35. 202 U. S. 584, 597.
36. Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 127 U. S. 117 (1887); American Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899); Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149 (1899).
37. 202 U. S. 584, 598.
38. 26 R. C. L. § 246.
39. "But it has not been decided, and it could not be decided, that a State
may not tax its own corporations for all their property within the State during the
tax year, even if every item of that property should be taken successively into
another State for a day, a week, or six months, and then brought back." 202 U. S.
584, 597.
40. 290 U. S. 158 (1933). The corporation here involved was an Illinois
corporation but its fleet of tank cars operated from a refinery in Oklahoma returning
thereto when empty. Oklahoma attempted to tax the full value, though all cars
were outside the state from twenty to twenty-nine days during each month. The
1945
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restricting a state other than the domicile of the owner to a proportionate
share of the valuation for tax purposes, to lead necessarily to a different con-
clusion. Whether considerations derived from the commerce clause should
lead to a different result is the only issue.
The majority opinion in the Northwest Airlines case apparently recog-
nizes the basis for tax apportionment on the part of states other than the
owner's domicile in interstate commerce situations such as involved in the
Pzdluhazs Palace Car case and others noted above, but insists that the tax-
ing power of the domiciliary state has a very different basis, and while
Congress could, for the protection of interstate commerce, place limitations
upon its taxing power, it has not done so and "no judicial restriction has
been applied against the domiciliary State except when property ... is per-
manently situated in a state other than the domiciliary State."41 Such is
said to be meaning of the New York Central case which the majority
opinion asserts clearly should rule the Northwest Airlines case.
The facts of the Northwest Airlines case approximate very closely in
many respects those in the New York Central case. The corporate domi-
cile was in Minnesota with the principal place of business at St. Paul, which
city was designated as the home port registered with the Civil Aeronautics
Authority, and where all work of rebuilding and overhauling planes took
place, though bases for minor repairs were maintained in six cities in as
many states. A fleet of airplanes operated through eight states including
Minnesota over fixed routes and on regular schedules. The scheduled route
mileage in Minnesota was about 14% of the total and the scheduled plane
mileage about 16%. Some of the other states taxed a proportionate part
of the value of the planes based apparently on the doctrine of the rolling
stock cases. This constituted the principal difference from the New York
Central case where the cars involved were not operating over fixed routes
and on regular schedules and where there was no showing that any of the
cars were so continuously in any other state as to be taxable there, though
a considerable proportion of the company's cars (not the same cars) were
outside the state of domicile at all times during the tax year. This difference
is not regarded as important by the majority opinion since none of the
only issue here presented to the Court, was one of situs and jurisdiction to tax
under the due process clause. No question of a burden on interstate commerce
was raised.
41. 322 U. S. 292, 298.
Vol, 10
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1945], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol10/iss3/2
STATE TAXATION OF AIRPLANES
planes were "continuously without the State during the whole tax year" so
as to make the doctrine of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky
applicable.42
It is the conclusion of the prevailing opinion in this case (the Northwest
Airlines case) that there is no justification, either on the basis of the com-
merce clause or on considerations of due process, for judicially introducing
the doctrine of apportionment as a limitation upon the taxing power of
the domiciliary state, and there is a strong intimation that any move in
that direction as a protection of interstate commerce should wait upon
legislative judgment.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone does not question
the basis of jurisdiction under due process considerations for the tax here
in question by the state of domicile,43 but asserts its invalidity as a viola-
tion of the commerce clause of the Constitution and undertakes to show
that such a conclusion is required by prior decisions, chiefly those dealing
with the matter of state taxation of railroad rolling stock and the application
of the doctrine of apportionment. In arriving at his conclusion the Chief
Justice makes important use of the decisions in Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky and the New York Central case though he gives to both
an interpretation greatly at variance from that applied by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and commonly accepted previously.
This opinion is based on the assumption, perhaps not too clearly re-
pudiated by the majority opinion, that the railroad rolling stock apportion-
ment theory must apply to the case of airplanes employed in interstate
42. Id. at 295.
43. Near the end of Mr. Chief Justice Stone's opinion he asserts that, "The
extent to which one state may constitutionally tax the instruments of interstate
transportation does no depend on what other states may happen to do, but on
what the taxing state has constitutional power to do." This statement would seem
to have reference to the restricting power of the commerce clause, but immediately
thereafter is the following: "The jiurisdiction of Minnesota to tax 'must be deter-
mined on a basis which is consistent with the like jurisdiction of other States.'"
(Italics supplied.) The included quotation comes from Johnson Oil Refining Co.
v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 162 (1933) where a state other than domicile was
attempting to tax the whole value of a fleet of tank cars operating into and our
of the state. The theory of the state's tax apparently was that the presence in the
state of the principal refinery from which the tank cars operated and to which
empty cars always returned served to create for the corporation something of a
commercial domicile which should entitle that state to tax all of the cars in spite of
the fact that all cars were outside of the state two-thirds or more of the time.
What the result would have been if Oklahoma had been the state of incorporation
was, of course, not determined.
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transportation as here involved, and then reasons that since the other states
through which the planes operate over fixed routes and regular schedules
and in which they pick up and deliver goods and passengers must have
the right to tax on a proportionate basis, to allow the state of domicile to
tax for the full value would result in the imposition of a total tax burden
far in excess of the tax that would be imposed by any one state on vehicles
whose movements were confined within its territorial limits. Such a bur-
den to which intrastate carriers would not be subjected would result directly
from the fact of the planes being engaged in interstate commerce and must
tend strongly to the destruction of the interstate business in question.
Thus the premise on which the opinion is based is that such property
used in interstate commerce cannot, consistent with the commerce clause
of the Constitution, be subjected to taxation by a combination of states on
a combined valuation greater than its actual value on which it could be
taxed by a single state if kept permanently therein, and to the extent to which
other states may apply a tax on some basis of apportionment, just so far
must the state of domicile deduct from the valuation upon which it is per-
mitted to tax. Stated as a restriction which reasonably should be imposed
as a matter of policy for the protection of interstate commerce from the
burdens of multiple state taxation, such a propostion may well merit wide-
spread commendation. Stated as a constitutional limitation on state juris-
diction to tax, or as judicially established doctrine to be found in previously
decided Supreme Court cases, it is clearly subject to considerable doubt.
After referring to the state of the Court in Nashville C. I. &g St. L.
Ry. v. Browning" to the effect that the state could not "'use a fiscal form-
ula... to project the taxing power of the state plainly beyond its borders,"'
a case in which the state's attempted tax was fully sustained, the disenting
opinion asserts broadly that the Supreme Court "has accordingly held in-
valid state taxation of vehicles of interstate transportation unless the tax
is equitably apportioned to the use of the vehicles within the state com-
pared to their use without, whether the tax is laid by the state of the domni-
cile or another."'14 No such cases are cited and it is not believed that there
are any cases where a tax imposed by a domiciliary state with reference
to such vehicles operating within the state during the tax year has been
held bad because not apportioned. The further assertion is made that "if
44. 310 U. S. 362 (1940).
45. 322 U. S. 292, 314. (Italics supplied.)
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the tax is laid without apportionment or if the apportionment, when made,
is plainly inequitable so as to bear unfairly on the commerce by compelling
the carrier to pay to the taxing state more than its fair share of the tax
measured by the full value of the property, this Court has set aside the
tax as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. . .".4 For this
proposition a number of cases are cited but none involves a defeated at-
tempt by a domiciliary state to impose such a tax. A similar statement is
made with respect to state taxes on gross receipts from interstate com-
merce, for which many cases are cited, but quite obviously the problem is
not the same. And when one considers the maze of decisions, not always
too clearly consistent,47 involving gross receipts taxes and the closely re-
lated sales and use taxes, from the Case of the State Freigh.t Tax8 and
State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts-9 through McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co.50 International Harvester Co. v. Department of
Treasury of Indiana,(1 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 52 and General Trad-
ing Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa,53 with their resulting confusion,54
the inapplicability of those cases as any immediate solvent of the problem
here in hand becomes abundantly clear.
The final appeal to precedent by Mr. Chief Justice Stone to defeat
the tax is to the effect that "both before and since the Miller (New York
Central) case this Court has ruled that vehicles of interstate" transportation
regularly moving to and from the state of domicile from and to other states
acquire a tax situs in the latter, and that the state of domicile cannot con-
stitutionally levy on them an unapportioned property tak."'5 As to the
first part of this assertion there is no question, but as to the last it is not
46. Id. at 315.
47. Cf. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891) with Galveston,
H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); American Manufacturing Co. v.
St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919) with Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storem, 304
U. S. 307 (1938) and Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434
(1939).
48. 15 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1873).
49. 15 Wall. 284 (U. S. 1873), repudiated by Philadelphia & Southern Steam-
ship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887).
50. 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
51. 322 U. S. 340 (1944).
52. 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
53. 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
54. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes: The Berwind-White
Case, 53 HAxv. L. REv. 909 (1940); Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate
Transportation and Communication, 57 HAv. L. REv. 40 (1943).
55. .322 U. S. 292, 324.
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believed that any case has squarely so decided. The cases cited to sustain
the assertion are Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, Johnson Oil
Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, all
of which are referred to above. The Union Transit case has been sufficiently
dealt with and need not be discussed again. The Johnson Oil Refining Co.
case did not involve a tax by the domiciliary state and the most that can
be found is a sort of dictum which may lend some support to the assertion
set out in the above quotation.5 The Browning5 7 case certainly provides
no stronger support. There the State of Tennessee, apparenty the domicile,
imposed a tax on the railroad company's "distributable" property attribut-
able to that state on the basis of the ratio of the company's mileage in
Tennessee to its total mileage, and the tax was sustained against a com-
plaint based on the alleged comparative revenue-producing capacity of the
company's lines in and out of the state. The only language of the whole
opinion of any pertinence here was the general statement to the effect that
"a state cannot ... use a fiscal formula ... to project the taxing power of
the state plainly beyond its borders."58
The statement set forth at the outset of this discussion that tangible
personal property permanently located in another state cannot be sub-
56. It is stated that the oil refining company ". . . had its domicile in Illinois.
and that State had jurisdiction to tax appellant's personal property which had
not acquired an actual situs elsewhere .... But the state of domicile has no juris-
diction to tax personal property where its actual situs is in another state. ... While,
in this instance, it cannot be doubted that the cars in question had acquired an
actual situs outside the State of Illinois, the mere fact that appellant had its refinery
in Oklahoma would not necessarily fix the situs of the entire fleet of cars in that
State. The jurisdiction of Oklahoma to tax property of this description must be
determined on a basis which is consistent with the like jurisdiction in other States
* .,. . When a fleet of cars is habitually employed in several States-the individual
cars constantly running in and out of each State-it cannot be said that any one
of the States is entitled to tax the entire number of cars regardless of their use in
other States." 290 U.S. 158, 161, 162 (1933). It should also here be observed that
it was found as a fact and not disputed that "They (the company's tank cars) are
very infrequently used in connection with an oil plant appellant owns in Illinois."
290 U. S. at 160. Thus, for all that appears, it may well have been that a very
large proportion of the cars in question had not been inside the physical confines
of the domiciliary state at any time during the tax years. Whether they had not
was of no concern to the Court in that case, for only the taxing power of Oklahoma,
a non-domiciliary state, was at issue.
57. 310 U. S. 362 (1940).
58. Id. at 365. The case of Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 (1920), was cited
in support of this statement which case involved a state tax on a foreign railway
corporation measured by that portion of its total property which the track mileage
in the state bore to total track mileage when the more expensive construction
and the valuable terminals were all outside the state. Certainly the case is small
help in the solution of the problem here involved.
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jected to taxation by the state of the owner's domicile, which was definitely
set at rest by the decision in the Union Transit case forty years ago is sub-
jected to some confusion by the dissenting opinion in the Airlines case.
It is, of course, widely accepted also that such property as rolling stock of
railroads employed in the continuous process of operating into and out of
states other than the owner's domicile, if over regular routes and on fixed
schedules, acquires such a so-called taxable situs in those states as to give
to such states jurisdiction to apply a tax, if done on some basis reasonably
calculated to get at a fair proportion of the property value. Mr. Chief
Justice Stone asserts in this case that property so acquiring a taxable situs
in another state is permanently outside of the state of domicile to the extent
that it is taxable in other states and thus to that extent beyond the taxing
power of the domiciliary state. This is the doctrine for which he asserts the
Union Transit- case stands, after stating that the cars in question "moved
in and out of Kentucky," the state of domicile. Whether they did or did
not so move in any great numbers is nowhere indicated, as explained above,
and there is no language in the entire opinion consistent with the notion
that such a doctrine is being asserted except the statement in the last sen-
tence of the opinion to the effect that "the cars in question, so far as they
were located and employed in other States than Kentucky, were not sub-
ject to the taxing power of that Commonwealth. . ."0 The most that can
be said with assurance about this statement is that it is somewhat equivocal
and standing alone would be consistent with the doctrine asserted by the
Chief Justice.
It seems abundantly clear that any attempt to show that previously
decided cases have actually applied to other property, such as rolling stock
of railroads, the doctrine asserted by the dissenting opinion in the Airlines
case must fail. This does not mean, however, that earlier cases do not
lend support to the process of reasoning there employed or that the Court
might not have extended to this case the process of reasoning responsible
for the statement in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, that "The
vice characteristic of those (gross receipts taxes) which have been held
invalid is that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such nature-as
to be capable, in point of substance, of being imposed . . with equal right
by every state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate
59. 322 U. S. 292, 324, n. 5.
60. 199 U. S. 194, 211.
1945
15
Howard: Howard: State Taxation of Airplanes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1945
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce
clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce."0 1
This principle that the risk of a cumulative burden from multiple state
taxation on interstate commerce to which local commerce will not be sub-
jected is sufficient to invalidate a tax has been reasserted in other recent
cases, 2 and conceivably, as evidenced by the dissenting opinion, it could
have been extended, though not without some difficulty, to apply in the
case of airplanes employed in interstate commerce over fixed routes on
regular schedules so that each state involved, other than that of domicile,
would be permitted to tax on a proportionate basis similar to the case of
railroad rolling stock, and the state of domicile would be restricted to tax-
ing a similar proportionate part of the total value so as to avoid ". . . the
risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is not exposed.
'113
Such a holding would, as matter of principle, require a similar handling
of railroad rolling stock cases in the future. Whether its application to the
domiciliary state in the rolling stock cases would necessarily require that
it also be applied to the airplane cases is somewhat less clear. The obvious
difference, of course, lies in the fact that railroad rolling stock operating
over rights of way and trackage acquired or built in accordance with the
laws of the state, is directly within the physical control of the state within
which it operates, while the same cannot be said of airplanes passing over
states, doubly so- when they do not land. The latter situation alone, accord-
ing to Mr. Justice Jackson, whether the overhead passage be on regular
routes and schedules or only casually, clearly would confer no jurisdiction to
tax. It is also his belief that the landing of a plane, even regularly and on
a fixed schedule, to pick up and discharge passengers or cargo, or to under-
go repairs would not alter the situation. It is this factual difference be-
tween airplane traffic and that of rolling stock of railroads that is responsi-
ble for the position taken in his concurring opinion that the analogy to ship
property rather than to railroad rolling stock should control and that only
the state of domicile should be permitted to tax.0 4
If, as seems to be admitted by Mr. Chief Justice Stone's dissenting
61. 303 U. S. 250, 255, 256 (1938).
62. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1938); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439 (1939). Of. McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309, U. S. 33, 48, 58 (1940).
63. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439 (1939).
64. 322 U. S. 292, 303, 304.
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opinion,6 5 there is some doubt as to whether mere passage over a state,
however regular, without landing would confer jurisdiction for state taxa-
tion,"" the problem of making a proper apportionment of value as among
the states claiming a right to tax may be beset with no little difficulty. In
the Northwest Airlines case the planes apparently had no regular stops in
one of the eight states over which they regularly operated. 67 That situation
might well appear in greatly exaggerated form in the case of transconti-
nental air lines with the result that restricting the proportion of value
taxable in the state of domicile to that percentage which the mileage, either
route or plane, within it bears to total mileage, might well result in less than
the full value being subjected to state taxation in all of the states combined.
Taking the average number of planes in the state all the time would not
obviate the difficulty, which is not so much that of probable failure by all
of the states combined to tax the full value of the planes but is one arising
from the uncertainty involved in determining the proper share of the domi-
ciliary state. Particularly is this true when it is assumed that the latter
state can tax to the extent that a so-called situs has not been acquired
elsewhere giving other states jurisdiction to tax. That, of course, is to
combine theories heretofore employed in state taxation of railroad rolling
stock by non-domiciliary states and the taxation of ship property at the
state of domicile when it has not acquired a situs for tax purposes else-
where though outside of the domiciliary state substantial portions or even
all of the tax year. As a matter of fact, it is correct to say that this is a
generally accepted doctrine as to the taxation of tangible personal property
which finds application in the case of ship property. But as previously
applied it is the whole value that is taxed by the state of domicile and not
some otherwise untaxed portion. The doctrine here proposed by the dissent-
ing opinion would be a modification of that applied in the ship cases and
would apvly to the domiciliary state the converse of the theory by which
states other than domicile are permitted to tax a proportionate part of
65. Id. at 312, n. 1. "We need not consider here whether the jurisdiction of
a state over air above it ... affords a basis for taxation of planes which regularly
fly over the state but do not regularly land within its borders."
66. Mr. Justice Jackson vigorouslj denies that such a state would have any
basis for asserting a right to tax (Id. at 304), and there is no indication of the
view taken by other members of the Court.
67. See 322 U. S. 292, 308, 322, for an indication of eight states. That regular
stops were made in only six of the seven states other than Minnesota is indicated
in 322 U. S. 292, 312, n. 1. See also, 7 N. W. (2d) 691, 693 (1942).
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the value, and would allow the state of domicile to tax only that portion
of the value which is not determined, by some method of apportionment,
to have acquired a situs for taxation elsewhere. When part of an air travel
route is over the open sea or over a foreign country,68 the problem takes
on additional complexities, all of which point to a substantial question as
to whether the attempted application of the theory employed in state tax-
ation of railroad rolling stock is likely to supply a satisfactory solution to
this new and troublesome problem. It is always a doubtful matter whether
the Court shoud attempt to apply by analogy a legal doctrine developed with
respect to one type of situation to a new and different situation where the
factual analogy is by no means complete. The present case presents the
added difficulty of the legal doctrine in question never having been fully
worked out in its application to the old situation before the Court is called
upon to apply it to the new. Here the Court is called upon to assume that
the doctrine which allows states other than the domicile to tax a propor-
tionate part of the value of railroad rolling stock operating in interstate
commerce within their borders must require that the state of domicile be
restricted in its taxation to that portion of the value which the other states
cannot tax, and to apply that assumption to the case of airplane companies
whose planes require the acquisition of no rights of way, the laying or
building of no surface lines, and which planes may not be within the taxing
power of any other state a portion of the time that they are outside the
physical confines of the domiciliary state. One may not inappropriately add
to the confusion by suggesting the separation of domicile and "home port"
in the case of an airplane company incorporated in one state but with its
principal place from which its operations are carried on in another. The
case of Johnson, Oil Relining Co. which encounters one aspect of this situa-
tion in the case of rolling stock leaves many problems wholly unanswered.
What the attitude of those justices accepting the majority opinion of
68. In the case here under consideration some of the planes did make regular
flights between Fargo, North Dakota, and Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. State
v. Northwest Airlines, 7 N. W. (2d) 691, 693 (1942). How important this factor
might or might not become, it is hardly profitable to speculate. A tax on a pro-
portionate part of the value by a foreign country would contribute to a burden
on commerce equally with that of a sister state. There would, of course be no
power in our federal government, legislative or judicial, to control such a tax.
Whether the Court would attempt to make a distinction between such a tax and
that of a sister state on some basis comparable to its none to happy attempt made
in connection with multiple taxation of intangibles in such- cases as Burnet v. Brooks,
288 U. S. 378 (1933), seems highly doubtful.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Airlines case may have been on the matter of
taxation of airplane property by states other than the domicile is nowhere
clearly indicated, and the opinion expressly excluded that matter from con-
sideration, but did assert that the doctrine of tax apportionment "... is
here inapplicable." 9
If the majority opinion contemplates the recognition of a right on the
part of other states than that of domicile to tax on some apportionment
theory similar to that used in the case of railroad rolling stock, as Mr. Justice
Stone asserts must of necessity exist, the problem of how effectively to pre-
vent such instrumentalities of interstate commerce from being subjected
to the "risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is not exposed"
is one that must be met. In the Airlines case the mileage outside the state
of domicile was approximately 85(%.70 If other states apply their tax to
all or most of this proportionate value while the state of domicile taxes
the entire value, the resulting disadvantage to interstate as compared with
local facilities is something that can hardly be ignored for long.
If one looks only to the analyses contained in the opinions presented
in this case for a solution, the two possible methods of ultimately deal-
ing with the problem would seem to be either that asserted by Mr. Justice
Stone in his dissenting opinion, with all of its difficulties, or that which
prompted the seperate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black. The Court
was faced with a matter of choice and it rejected the solution offered by
the former without affirmatively accepting that suggested by the latter.
It is not at all clear, however, that the whole of the five man majority may
not have been willing to accept the thesis of Mr. Justice Black to the effect
that this is a matter clearly within the scope of Congress' power, and that
when all of the difficulties and uncertainties involved in the proper protec-
tion of interstate commerce from potential. burdens of state taxation are
considered, which difficulties and uncertainties 4re accentuated by the in-
ability of one state in formulating its tax policy or its formula of apportion-
ment to know the extent to which other states may be permitted to tax,
and by the inability of the Court to deal with the problem otherwise than
by "Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation,' '71 it becomes the part
of wisdom for the Court to approach that problem, particularly as related to
69. 322 U. S. 292, 295, 297.
70. 86% of prescribed route mileage and 84% of daily plane mileage. Id. at 299.
71. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U .S. 176, 189 (1940).
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a new enterprise, with caution, and to hold state taxes unconstitutional
only when the burdening effect upon interstate commerce is clear, and the
actual burden upon the interstate business of the particular litigant is un-
fair and unjust.72 To what extent the tax in the case here under considera-
tion may or may not result in such burden depends on the extent to which
other states may apply a similar tax. That necessarily was not before the
Court here. To the extent that the Court holds such tax by the domiciliary
state invalid without knowing its effect as combined with the taxes of
other states, or certainly without having determined the extent to which
other states may be permitted to tax, it is formulating a rule of state taxa-
tion, as matter of policy, for the future protection of interstate commerce.
It is the thesis of Mr. Justice Black that Congress, with "facilities for ac-
quiring the necessary data"' 3 by the process of a "broad and deliberate
legislative investigation-which no court can make"74_-is the "only depart-
ment of our government-State or Federal-vested with authority to de-
termine . . . what regulations, if any, should protect interstate commerce
from 'multiple taxation.' " "Congress alone can, in the exercise of its
plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only consider
whether such a tax as now under scrutiny is consistent with the best in-
terests of our national economy, but can also on the basis of full explora-
tion of the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy
fair alike to the States and to our Union. ' 6
Even if we should assume that the Court will hold that the doctrine
of apportionment in the taxation of rolling stock is to be extended to re-
quire that the valuation taxable in the state of domicile be reduced to that
amount not taxable in other states, it may still be asserted that to he
extent that airplanes are like ships and stop at port only from time to time
and may be part of the time over the sea or over a foreign country, the
same doctrine should be extended to the taxation of airplanes only with
a great deal of caution. If a cruising airplane high above a state's surface,
possibly in the stratosphere, and never stopping at any of its ports, is not
receiving any protection from that state, is not within its control, and con-
sequently not within its taxing jurisdiction, any attempt to apply a rule
72. J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 328 (1938).
73. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 452 (1939).
74. Id. at 449.
75. Id. at 452.
76. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940).
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formulated for application to rolling stock of a railroad, much less to extend
it as here suggested, may well be a proper subject for serious and prolonged
consideration as matter of policy. And when one considers the further fact
that attempts by the Court in the past to determine policies of limitation
upon state taxation have sometimes resulted in greater confusion rather
than greater clarity, the wisdom of Mr. Justice Black's counsel of caution
is accentuated77
Perhaps the two alternative solutions above noted are not the only
possibilities. The attitude of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Justices Douglas
and Murphy who silently concurred in the opinion of the Court, on the
right of states other than the domicile to tax a proportionate part of the
value, as indicated above, is not entirely clear. The opinion itself states
that the issue "is not now before us" and that the "fact that Northwest
paid personal property taxes for the year 1939 upon 'some proportion of
its full value' of its airplane fleet in some other states does not abridge the
power of taxation of Minnesota as the home state of the fleet in the cir-
cumstances of the present case."78 This would seem to be to ignore that
problem completely and indicate no opinion on or concern with it here.
But is some later parts of the opinion where Mr. Justice Frankfurter de-
plores the rule of apportionment as "beset with friction, waste and difficul-
ties" and recognizes that it "has established itself in regard to land com-
merce," 719 and refers to the matter of its application to "the totally new
problems presented by the very different modes of transportation and
77. This is well illustrated by the restrictions imposed by the Court upon
state taxation of intangibles on the basis of due process considerations in such
cases as Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284
U. S. 312 (1932), which cases were repudiated or specifically overruled a decade
later. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S.
383 (1939); and State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
See also Howard, Recent Developments and Tendencies in the Taxation of
Intangibles, 44 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5 (1931); and Howard, State Jurisdiction
to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 Mo. L.Rav. 155 (1943). Another
good illustration of somewhat similar difficulties is to be found in the Court's
handling of the problem of state apportionment or allocation of income for purposes
of taxation where the income is derived from a unitary business not confined to
a single state. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113
(1920); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd., v. State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271
(1924); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc., v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931); and
Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942). See also 40 YALE L. J. 1273
(1931).
78. 322 U. S. 292, 295.
79. Id at 300.
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communication that the airplane and the radio have already introduced"
as raising "questions that we ought not to anticipate, ' '8 ° the suggestion
seems to be implicit that he does recognize the existence of the rule as being
applicable to the case of railroad rolling stock for purposes of allowing states
other than domicile to tax but is unwilling to extend the rule to the case
of airplanes: Earlier in the opinion, however, are statements that may seem,
at least when taken alone, to indicate an unwillingness to recognize the
rule of apportionment at all and to restrict taxation by the non-domiciliary
state in the case of rolling stock to such items of property as are perma-
nently located in the taxing state.8' It is possible, of course, that all of this
language is intended to apply only to the matter of restricting the taxing
power of the domiciliary state with no concern with whether other states
may or may not at the same time tax on some proportionate basis. If
the meaning is left somewhat less than clear, little by way of clarity is added
by the final statement in this part of the opinion-"But no judicial restric-
tion has been applied against the domiciliary State except when property
(or a portion of fungible units) [whatever that may mean] is permanently
80. Ibid.
81. This attitude is particularly reflected in references to New York Central
v. Miller and Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma. "It was not shown in the
Miller case and it is not shown here that a defined part of the domiciliary corpus
has acquired a permanent location, i.e., a taxing situs, elsewhere". 322 U. S. 292,
295. "In the Johnson Oil Refining Co. case ... this Court reaffirmed .. . that the
State of domicile has jurisdiction to tax the personal property of its corporation
unless such property has acquired an 'actual situs' in another State. And by 'actual
situs' is meant ... continuous presence in another State which thereby supplants
the home State and acquires the taxing power over personalty that has become
a permanent part of the foreign State. Surely the situs which personal property
may acquire for tax purposes in a State other than that of the owner's domicile
cannot be made to depend on some undefined concept of 'permanence' short of a
tax year. . . ." 322 U. S. 292, 296, n. 2. To somewhat the same effect is the
statement, "But the doctrine of apportionment has neither in theory nor in practice
been applied to tax units of interstate commerce visiting for fractional periods of the
taxing year.' 322 U. S. 292, 297. Whether this means merely that a single temporary
presence would not be sufficient for tax purposes but that presence of changing
items of equipment throughout the tax year would be sufficient, or whether it
means that only continuous absence from the domiciliary State for the whole of
the tax year will reduce its power to tax and likewise continuous presence in a
non-domiciliary State for the whole of the tax year is necessary to give it power to
tax, is not entirely clear, an dthe ensuing reference to and quotation from Pdillman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania does little to clarify the meaning. The same may
be said of the further statement that "The continuous protection by a State other
than the domiciliary State-that is, protection throughout the tax year-has
furnished the constitutional basis for tax apportioiment in these interstate commerce
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situated in a State other than the domiciliary State. And permanently means
continuously throughout the year, not a fraction thereof, whether days or
weeks. ' ' s1
If the reader of the opinion finds some uncertainty in the meaning he
may console himself by the feeling that some confusion appears to have
existed in the minds of other members of the Court. Mr. Justice Black,
apparently, was not sure that the Frankfurter opinion had not, impliedly
at least, denied the right of all states other than the domicile to tax and
felt called upon to say that he "... would not in this case foreclose con-
sideration of the taxing rights of States other than Minnesota."'S3 Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson, on the other hand, while concurring in the conclusion reached
by the opinion of the Court, was prompted to say, "I do not accept the
opinion because it falls short of commitment that Minnesota's right is
exclusive of any similar right elsewhere. '8 4 Mr. Chief Justice Stone in his
dissenting opinion apparently accepted the same interpretation when. he
said, "If the tax levied here were held to be exclusive of all property taxes
imposed on petitioner's airplanes by other states there could be no serious
question of an undue burden on interstate commerce. That -question arises
now only because the rationale found necessary to support the present tax
leaves other states free to impose comparable taxes on the same property
used in interstate commerce which Minnesota has already taxed for the
entire taxable year and at its full value.' 's
It is, of course, entirely possible that Mr. Justice Frankfurter may
have been at pains to avoid any commitment on the matter of taxation
by other states leaving that for a later case that would seem to be certain
soon to arise. And that eventuality is what gives rise to the suggestion above
of a third possibility in the solution of the problem of avoiding cumulative
tax burdens on the facilities of irnterstate commerce. Regardless of what the
ultimate attitude of Justices Frankfurter, Douglas and Murphy may be on
this matter, we do know that Mr. Justice Jackson, albeit for reasons all his
own, would deny the right of states other than the domicile to tax. Then if
it may be assumed that the principal concern of the four dissenting justices
82. 322 U. S. 292, 298.
83. Id. at 301.
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. at 309. In this connection one must bear in mind that the principal,
if not the only concern of Mr. Chief Justice Stone was the avoidance of the burden
resulting from multiple state taxation.
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was the avoidance of a multiple tax burden, it is quite possible that in a
second case involving taxation by a non-domiciliary state they might accept
as settled law the decision of this case and deny taxability by any other state.
As noted above, there may be considerable reason to expect Justices Frank-
furter, Douglas and Murphy to join in such a conclusion. That conclusion
could be reached without disturbing the railroad rolling stock cases on the
basis of a factual distinction between the operation of rolling stock and
airplanes. It seems certain that Mr. Justice Jackson would not only accept
such a result but would also join in the reasoning by which it is arrived at.
Such is indicated by his rather grudging acceptance of the apportionment
principle as applied to rolling stock, which he describes as "a mongrel one,
a cross between desire not to interfere with state taxation and desire at
the same time not utterly to crush out interstate commerce,' ' s and his
disinction between the methods of commerce employed by railroads and
airplanes.8 7
In the event of such a decision with respect to state taxation of air-
planes, however, it would not be wholly surprising to see the Court re-
examine the whole doctrine of apportionment for the taxation of rolling
stock, particularly in view of the disagreement among the justices on the
proper interpretation of cases like Uion Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ken-
ticky and the New York Central case on the matter of reducing valuation
for tax purposes in the domiciliary state to the extent taxes are permitted
by other states.
Whatever the ultimate outcome may be with respect to the various
aspects of this problem, it is obvious that the state of the law with respect
to state taxation of tangible personal property is by no means so free from
confusion and difficulty now as has seemed to be the case during much of
the past forty years.
86. Id. at 306.
87. "A state has a different relation to rolling stock of railroads than it has
to airplanes. Rolling stock is useless without surface rights and continuous structures
on every inch of land over which it operates." Ibid. "I cannot consider that to
alight out of the skies'onto a landing field and take off again into the air confers
any greater taxing jurisdiction on the state than for a ship for the same purposes
to come alongside a wharf on the water and get under way again." Id. at 304. The
latter, of course, confers no taxing power.
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